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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ELMER HANKS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MARK CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 9190 
RESPONDENT•s BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant OiWiled large tracts of uncleared 
land in the foofuills of South Utah County for many years 
prior to 1958. Defendant in recent years had been dearing 
his land by fire and 'bulld~r to grow dry-land ·crops. He 
had constructed numerous fire-breaks at the request of the 
fire wardens around and criss-erossing his property (Tr. 373 
to 379). On October 18, 1958, respondent burned some 
brush piles under a valid burning permit, the conditions of 
which he fully complied with. The fires were started com-
pletely surrounded by firebreaks in the early morning on a 
calm day (Tr. 383 to 388; 417 to 418). A small fire was 
noticed by respondent late in the afternoon North of Fire-
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2 
break E heading north down Snell Hollow toward appel-
lant's land 100 rods away, whtch fire respondent and his 
wife were unable to control because of changeable gusts of 
wind (Tr. 389 to 392). When the fire flared in the wind 
endangering their lives, they went for help while the fire 
was still on "respondent's ground and they got back with 
the fire department before the fire crossed over onto the 
lands of the appellant. The fire was driven down the slope 
by the wind onto appellant's lands and became so intense 
that fue fire truck had to leave dragging its hoses (Tr. 392 
to 397). The flames were 50 to 60 feet high and ash carried 
over half a mile by the strong wind (Tr. 399). The appel-
lant's own expert witnesses-the Fire Wardens-testified 
that the pernritted fire was put out of control by unusual, 
gusty-type winds that arose in the mid-afternoon and be-
came e!Ven stronger bad winds later in the evening, forcing 
the fire downhill onto appellant's land and causing the fire 
to remain out of control even with fire-fighting equipment 
there (Tr. 185 to 188; 224 to 229). This was corroborated 
by respondent's witnesses and by respondent (Tr. 363 to 
370; 403 to 405; 460 to 461). 
After the fire the parties discussed the damage in the 
presence of the Fire Chief and respondent claimed the par-
ties· entered into an executory contract whereby respond-
ent was to immediately reseed the range ground of appel-
lant, rebuild fences and replace cedar posts ·with metal 
posts, reseed alfalfa damaged by bulldozer and allow appel-
lant free grazing privileges until his own grazing lands were 
restored. Respondent did reseed appellant's burned ground 
by airplane and bought fence posts but appellant filed this 
suit for $23,000.00 damages and denied that any contract 
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was made. Even after suit the respondent tendered restor-
ation to the appellant by completion of the alleged execu-
tory contract in his Answer but appellant refused to agree 
that any such contract existed and came into Court for 
money damages only (Tr. 415 to 416; 420 to 425). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS PRO-
CEDURE WITH REGARD 'ro THE INSTRUCTING OF 
THE JURY. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY THAT NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE 
IS "THE F AlLURE TO USE ORDINARY AND REA-
SONABLE CARE" AND THAT "ORDINARY CARE" 
WAS THE MEASURE OF CARE TO BE USED IN THIS 
CASE. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
UNDER A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE AN UNUSUAL WIND 
AT THE TIME OF STARTING THE FIRE AND IF AN 
UNUSUAL AND UNEXPECTED HIGH WIND AROSE 
DURING THlE PROGRESS OF THE FIRE AND CAR-
RIED THE FIRE WHERE IT WOULD NOT HAVE 
OTHERWISE SPREAD, SUCH WIND CONSTITUTES 
AN INTERVENING CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S IN-
JURY AND THE.DEFENDANT WOULD BE RELIEVED 
OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED THEREBY. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMIT-
TING THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS DRAWN 
TO THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS PRO-
CEDURE WITH REGARD TO THE INSTRUCTING OF 
THE JURY. 
It is most apparent that it is the duty of the Court, 
not counsel, to instruct the jury and if the instructions are 
proper and correct in a jury trial, the procedure employed 
by. the Court as to objections from counsel cannot be pre-
judicial to a party in the jury verdict. 'f.his is especially 
true when there is no objection in the record, as here-
not one scintilla, by counsel for the appellant objecting to 
the. Court's procedure. 
All of the objections in Point I and Point II of Appel-
lant's Brief relate to procedure in requesting proposed in-
structions and procedure in objecting to proposed instruc-
tiOns, all of which matters are improperly raised for the 
first time in Appellant's Brief. This appeal, at most, should 
turn on only Points III and IV of Appellant's Brief which 
relate to alleged faulty instructions. Said Points III and 
IV are answered in this Brief in Point II and III hereafter. 
At the outset, respondent objects to appellant's ver-
sion of what happened during the trial as to proposed in-
structiop.s and objections to instructions. There is nothing 
in the record nor in this appeal, like affidavits or written 
or 
1 s~ted objections, except the bald statements by coun-
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sel for appellant in his Brief as to what happened, and when, 
during the trial regarding improper procedure. Counsel 
for appellant does not say that he proffered his proposed 
instructions some time after the trial had begun and evi-
dence received, as was the case. As oounsel for respond-
ent recall, the trial judge informed both counsel for appel-
lant and for respondent what action was proposed on the 
instructions and on the issues of the case for the jury at 
least one day before the trial was concluded. The evidence 
and proof and the consequent issues were discussed by the 
trial judge with all ·counsel prior to the ·cooclusion of the 
trial. Counsel for appellant received his copy of the Court's 
instructions at the same time that eounsel for respondent 
did before the jury was instructed by the Court. 
Counsel for appellant argued his case to the jury ~ 
ing the instructions for the basis thereof, as did ·counsel 
for respondent. Respondent and his counsel saw nothing 
irregular in the Court's procedure and no objections were 
made by them either. Objections should be timely raised 
by appellant so that counsel for respondent as well as the 
Court have an opportunity to eorreet any errors or pos,. 
sible errors. .Appellant and his counsel were anxious and 
willing to have the case submitted to the jury, and made 
no objections to the Court or opposing ·counsel prior to 
the retiring of the jury to consider its verdict. The first 
inkling of claimed procedural irregularities appeared after 
the trial was over in appellant's Motion for New Trial. 
Appellant's Brief in Point II continually repeats that 
counsel for appellant "had no opportunity to make objec-
tions" or ''was not permitted" to do this or that. The rec-
ord shows no such thing. The Court does not request ob-
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jecUo!llS. The record shows courise~ for appellant had op-
portunity and did object often to items of evidence as they 
were given but he failed or made no attempt to speak up 
at any time about the conduct of . the case ·and he never 
informed the Court during the trial of his disapproval of 
or his objections ·to the proceedings - not even when he 
took his objections to the instructions following the argu-
ments to the jury (Tr. 467 to 470). However, respond-
ent's oounsel had time and opportunity (Tr. 467) to renew 
a motion for directed verdict to the Court prior to the in-
struction of the jury! The appellant had the same oppor-
tunity to speak as did respondent, but failed to do so or 
chose nort to do so, and therefore has waived any objec-
tions. Obvioosly, appellant's objection now to the proced-
ure of the Court is an afterthought to an adverse jury ver-
dict. 
AppeUant's counsel would have the Supreme Court be-
lieve he was. ignorant of the issues and evidence of the case 
until after the trial had been had. Lengthy depositions 
of.the parties were taken by counsel on December 9, 1958, 
by N·otice from appellant's counsel. A pretrial conference 
was held April 3, 1959, with all parties and counsel present 
wherein the facts and law were discussed and a Pretrial 
Order made by the Court. 
Appellant's ·counsel is norw ·standing for the proposi-
tion that it is imprope'r to require proposed ins:tructioos tp 
the jury until after all evidence is presented. The case 
of State Bank vs. Hollingshead, 82 U. 416, 25 P. 2nd 612, 
cited ·by appellant, holds· that an instruction must be sup-
ported by evidence so that an instruction based on testi.-
mooy not in the record is erroneous.. But, appellant's pro-
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posed corollary that instructions cannot be formulated or 
proposed, until all the evidence is taken, is false and con-
trary to Rule 51, U. C. A. 1953. Rule 51 also pvovides only 
a privilege that counsel may submit requested instructions. 
The rule puts the requirement on counsel to make objec-
tions to the instructions before the jury retires to ·consider 
its verdict. The Court in this case gave the instructions 
to the jury before arguments of ~counsel. Appellant has 
waived any alleged irregularities in procedure by failing 
to object thereto at the time. 
Rule 46, U. C. A. 1953, requires a party to make known 
to the Court the action which he desires the Court to take 
or his objection thereto and his grounds thereTor. 'Uhis the 
appellant and his counsel did not attempt to do. Rule 46 
does provide that failure to object is not prejudicial if a 
party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at 
the time it is made. In this case, however, appellant is not 
objecting to any ruling or order made by the Court! 
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5, pages 1903-4, COJV-
ering said Rule 46, makes dear. that a party must make it 
clear to the Court that he objects to the Courl's action and 
to state his grounds therefor in order to allow the Court 
to obviate the defect if possible; also, that a point not raised 
and preserved below will not be considered on appeal un-
less it is a "fundamental error" like allowing interest on 
a ·Claim in a Federal case contrary to applicabJe state law. 
At page 2503, and thereafter, of VIoL 5 of Moore's Federal 
Practice, covering Rule 51, most of the problems raised by 
appellant on procedure are answered. The party must ob-
ject distinctly and with particularity to allow the trial judge 
to understand the party's position and to correct possible 
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errors; also, a general objection to a charge raises no issue 
and a party must particularize grounds of objection to pre-
serve the right of appeal. 
Rule 61, U. C. A. 1953, specifically declares that minor 
defects in the procedural acts or omissions of a court are 
hannless error. Respondents assert that there was no er-
ror in the procedure of this case, but that even if appel-
lant's claims are true that it would have made no difference 
in the outcome of the case by the jury decision. Said Rule 
61 is as foilOIWS: 
''No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new 
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, un-
less refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at ev-
ery stage of the proceedings must disregard and error 
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCf-
ING THE JURY TH1AT NEGLIGENCE IN TillS CASE 
IS "THE FAILURE TO USE ORDINARY AND REA-
SONABLE CARE'' AND THAT ''ORDINARY CARE'' 
WAS THE MEASURE OF CARE TO BE USED IN THIS 
CASE. 
An analysis of appellant's Brief and even the objections 
to the jury instructions discloses that the only two mat-
ters being considered on appeal are the standard of care 
for negligence (appellant's Point III) and the intervening 
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cause of the wind (appellant's Point IV). The only peti-
nent objections by the appellant (Tr. 467 to 470) are in-
sufficient general objections that the instructions do nm 
represent the evidence or law. This is improper objecting. 
Ex:ceptrions to jury instructions ,must be spedfic and to par-
ticular language or a portion thereof or to how it injuri-
ously affects the rights of the party complaining. People 
vs. Berlin, 10 U. 39, 36 P. 199; Ryan vs. Beaver County, 
82 U. 27, 21 P. 2nd 858, 89 A. L. R. 125.3; Marks vs. Tomp-
kins, 7 U. 421, 27 P. 6. An objection to an instruction which 
states that "on the ground and for the reasons that such 
instruction is not supported by, and is contrary to, the law 
and the evidence" does not comply with the requirements 
of (Rule 51). Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co. 
vs. Allen Oil Co., 123 U. 253, 258 P 2nd 445, 450. 
On the merits of using the ordinary care standard of 
negligence by the Court in its instructio!IlS, it is obvious that 
the Court did not err in setting the standard of ordinary 
care, because this is the law. The case of Bushnell vs. Tel-
luride Power Co., 145 Federal 2nd 950, cited by appellant 
is truly the leading case and it sets ordinary care as the 
standard in a fire damage case. It was a Utah case where 
defendant was held negligent per se for starting a fire on 
restricted lands (spread by a subsequent wind) without 
first obtaining a fire permit contrary (the same as at pres-
ent) to the laws of Utah. However, the standard of care 
announced was that of ordinary care, citing Kendall vs. 
Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2nd 183. In the case at bar 
respondent Christensen had a valid fire permit (See Ex-
hibit) and conformed to the requirements thereof: 1. 
Calm· day (Tr. 224) 2. Cat standby (Tr. 402, 417) 3. 
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Notify fire departments (Tr. 418). There was no evidence 
to the -contrary. 
The Court should also note that appellant's own re-
quested instructions, especially No. 10, ask for the ordi-
nary care standard. The appellant would now ask this 
Court to find defendant-respondent negligent as a matter 
of law and complains that the lower court did not so in-
struct the jury! At best, it was a jury question if a con-
flict in the evidence existed, but the appellant did not even 
-carry the burden of proof necessary to prove negligence 
under the cireumstances. 24 ALR 2nd 254 to 259. Neg-
ligence cannot be presumed in a fire case where damage 
results. Kendall vs. Fordham, supra Instruction No. 4 
given by the Court defines negligence as the failure to do 
what an ordinary and reasonable person would have done 
under the circumstances. This is what the appellant's 
asked for! The items stated on Page 13 of appellant's Brief 
were contradicted in the evidence, were considered by the 
jury, but WeTe not the proximate cause of the damage. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
UNDER A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE AN UNUSUAL WIND 
AT THE TIME OF STARTING THE FIRE AND IF AN 
UNUSUAL AND UNEXPECTED HIGH WIND AROSE 
DURING TH!E PROGRESS OF THE FIRE AND CAR-
RIED THE FIRE WHERE IT WOULD NOT HAVE 
OTHERWISE SPREAD, SUCH WIND CONSTITUTES 
AN INTERVENING CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S IN-
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JURY AND THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE RELIEVED 
OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED THEREBY. 
The instrUction on the wind as an intervening cause 
was taken ahnost verbatim from 22 Am. Jur. 624, Sec. 46 
on F•lres. See also 45 ALR 877, 24 ALR 2nd 271. This 
is the law and was supported by the evidence in this case. 
Appellant's own expert witnesses, the Fire Wardens, on 
crciss-exam:ination both gave their conclusive opinions that 
the cause otf the fire getting out orf control wa:s the unusual, 
gusty-ltype, strong, stiff, erratic Winds that unexpectedly 
arose in mid-afternoon while the fire was still well within 
respondent's lands (Tr. 185 to 188, 224, 227 to 229). 
Instruction No. 12 by the Court about an ~terve:ning 
wind is the law as applied to this ~case. It is fully in aceord 
with Bushnell vs. TellUride Power Co., supra, because this 
is not a case of statutory negligence per se as in the BuSh-
nell case. The appellant would have this Cburt presume 
negligence on the defendant under this point as well. It 
should be noted, however, that the jury found specifically 
in the verdict that the defendant-respondent was not neg-
ligent in setting out the fires or tending the same, whereas 
said instruction No. 12 merely states that the defendant 
would be relieved of damages by a fire spread by ari inter-
vening cause of wind. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMIT-
TING THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS DRAWN 
TO THE JURY. 
The appellant did not except- to the special interroga--
tories in the verdict, either, and was perfectly willing at 
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the time that the case be committed to the jury under said 
instructions and said special verdict. It is interesting to 
note that the only objection made to the verdict as drawn, 
except the usual general objection made by appellant, was 
on the question as to whether there was a contract as al-
leged by the defendant to restore the plaintiff's property 
(Tr. 46:7 to 470). If that question were answeTed by the 
jury affirmatively, it put the plaintiff out m court as he 
denied any such contract which supplanted his claim for 
money damages. This was a proper and correct proced-
ure by the Court. However, the jury found no contract, 
even though it had been partially perfiormed by defendant-
respondent, but the jury found instead on the other ques-
tions that the defendant was not negligent in either setting 
out the fires or in managing, controlling or tending the 
fires. The plaintiff just failed to prove negligence on the 
defendant. The plaintiff-appellant has not proved nor 
shown where the instructions were erroneous as to his case, 
eitheT. 
It was a long, expensive trial with much ·as stake for 
the defendant-respondent. Appellant unnecessarily ordered 
a 4 75 page transcript and referred to only a very few por-
tions of it, as may be seen in his Brief, to further burden 
financially the respondent. The judgment on the verdict 
should be affirmed with costs to the respondent to avoid 
further litigation and expense. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORGAN AND PAYNE, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, 
Mark Christensen 
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